Note, I Shot the Sheriff, But Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege by Domb, Brian
Journal of Law and Health 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 5 
1991 
I Shot the Sheriff, but Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Brian Domb 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Recommended Citation 
Note, I Shot the Sheriff, but Only My Analyst Knows: Shrinking the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 5 J.L. 
& Health 209 (1990-1991) 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For 
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu. 
I SHOT THE SHERIFF, BUT ONLY MY ANALYST
KNOWS: SHRINKING THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 209
II. WHAT BROUGHT You HERE TODAY?: PRIVILEGE LAW
IN G ENERAL ..................................................... 211
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ........................... 216
IV. TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR CHILDHOOD: THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE ....................... 220
V. Do You HAVE ANY OTHER PROBLEMS?: OTHER
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE ............................................. 228
VI. Is THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS?:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
P RIVILEGE ....................................................... 229
VII. I SEE OUR SESSION IS ALMOST OVER: SOME
CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................ 236
I. INTRODUCTION
When Jose Menendez, a wealthy entertainment industry executive,
and his wife, Kitty, were found shotgunned to death in their North
Elm Drive mansion on the night of August 20, 1989, foul play by
organized crime was suspected at first. But last March, this wealthy
enclave was shocked when the police arrested the couple's two chil-
dren, Erik Menendez, 19 years old, and Joseph Lyle Menendez, 22,
and charged that they committed the crime to collect their $14 mil-
lion inheritance faster.... The arrests came a few days after the
police, armed with a search warrant, raided the Beverly Hills offices
of the psychologist, Dr. L. Jerome Oziel. . . . The chief evidence ap-
pears to be audio conversations between the two suspects and their
psychologist after the killing.'
The above excerpt, tragically all too real, from the Menendez case in
'Reinhold, Case of Two Brothers Accused of Killing Parents May Test Secrecy
Limit in Patient-Therapist Tie, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1990, at B9, col. 3 (nat'l ed.).
This case is currently making its way through the California courts. Although a
trial judge has ruled that the tapes can be used as evidence by the prosecution,
the California Supreme Court delayed the release of the tapes so that it could
decide whether to hear an appeal by lawyers for the defendants, who contend
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege cannot be broken. Id. The only reported
opinion to result so far from this tragic set of circumstances is Oziel v. Superior
Court (CBS Inc.), 233 Cal. App. 3d 1284, 273 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1990), which involved
the successful petition for a writ of mandamus by the psychologist to the Menendez
brothers. The writ sought to set aside an order of the Superior Court which had
granted public disclosure of videotapes made by the police of their search of Dr.
Oziel's home. Id.
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California, starkly reveals the continuous and unresolved tension be-
tween seeking truth in court and protecting confidentiality outside of
court. The prosecutors claim that the conversations between the brothers
and Dr. Oziel contain the best, and perhaps only evidence, connecting
them with their parents' murder.2 Attorneys for the defendants have
invoked the psychotherapist-patient privilege, a rule of evidence that may
exclude relevant evidence in order to protect the integrity of the thera-
peutic relationship between therapist and patient.3 It may shock or dis-
turb some to realize that the defendant may prevail on the evidentiary
issue which would likely result in an acquittal for the brothers even
though the evidence, if used, would probably convict them.4 As one com-
mentator has described it, Freud would argue for the defendants that the
evidence must not be admitted, for even a single concession to secrecy
would undermine the whole purpose of therapy which is to build a trusting
relationship.5 Brandeis, on the other hand, would argue for the prose-
cution that "sunlight is the best of disinfectants.
'6
This Note will discuss the psychotherapist-patient privilege as it relates
to past crimes and will use the Menendez facts to analyze different prob-
lems associated with the privilege. 7 First, privileges law in general will
2 See Reinhold, supra note 1. What is especially significant about the case is
that it raises the issue of whether the exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege should include a new category for information relating to past crimes.
3See infra notes 62-102 and accompanying text.
4The evidence would at least speak to the issue of the brothers' state of mind;
that is, that they thought about and considered murdering their parents and at
least thought that they had committed the murder.
Slovenko, Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Mis-
guided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 649 (1974).
6 Id. See Note, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777 (1985). "On the one hand, the state has
an interest in promoting the relationships that testimonial privileges protect, but
on the other hand, the goal of criminal courts is to convict the guilty and acquit
the innocent." Id. at 780. See also Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 598 (1980) which states that the dissonance
between seeking truth in court and protecting confidentiality outside of court
may eventually become too great for human beings to manage.
7 It should be pointed out, however, that the argument for the privilege in the
Menendez case may be greatly weakened because of the invasion of privacy that
has already taken place due to the publicity surrounding the litigation. The
privacy invasion coupled with the fact that the privilege would deprive a party
of very important evidence, makes the case for rejecting the privilege quite strong.
"When a medical problem becomes a legal issue, the need for evidence is great."
Saltzburg, supra note 6, at 648. It is also possible that Dr. Oziel may have a duty
to provide the information sought by the prosecutors. On the federal level at least,
the law specifies an offense called "misprison of felony," which provides that a
person is guilty of misprison when he has knowledge of the actual commission
of a felony and conceals and does not, as soon as possible, make known the same
to the authorities. Convictions under this law are rare because the courts have
held that the Government must prove an "affirmative" act of concealment to
make its case. See generally Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 375 (1975). State laws often include misprison of felony within the
psychotherapist-patient privilege so that on the state level this information is
still privileged. See, e.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.11 (Pages 1990).
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be described with an emphasis on the public policy rationales supporting
the specific privileges; ample space will then be devoted exclusively to
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, especially the unique problems as-
sociated with having any exceptions which allow testimony of psychoth-
erapeutic communications. The Note will then discuss the recognized
exceptions to the psychotherapist privilege to see if a case can be made
for an exception relating to past crimes. Empirical studies have shown
the futility in using the expectations of a reasonable patient about his or
her confidences in determining the reasonableness of an exception to the
privilege. Therefore, this Note argues for the adoption of a "not unrea-
sonable" standard in analyzing the psychotherapist-patient privilege ex-
ceptions to conclude that courts should define (and legislatures should
adopt) clearly worded psychotherapist-patient privilege rules with a hom-
icide exception for past crimes. The current existence of the judicial dis-
cretion approach to privilege exception problems underscores the need
for clearer and more uniform standards.
8
II. WHAT BROUGHT YOU HERE TODAY?: PRIVILEGE LAW IN GENERAL
The word privilege comes from the Latin words privata lex, a prerog-
ative given to a person or group of persons. 9 A privilege was originally
a judicially recognized point of honor among lawyers in England.10 Priv-
ileged communications are an exception to the general rule that all rel-
evant facts may be inquired into by a court of law. It may come as no
surprise to the reader of a legal journal that the only privilege allowed
under early common law was between attorney and client. Because the
client had a privilege not to be called by an opponent, it seemed unfair
to allow an opponent to call the client's lawyer to testify against her."
Many modern commentators have described the evidentiary privileges
as originating from competing professional jealousies, impeding the pur-
suit of truth and serving no important societal goal; privileges originate
from the political influence of those who benefit from them.12 One scholar
has written that "the poor man's only privilege is perjury."'13 Another
See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
* Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Washington: Extending the
Privilege to Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WASH. L. REV. 565, 566 n.6
(1983).
Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 413 (Alaska 1976).
"See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2290 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter
WIGMORE].
12 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 77, at 156-57, 159 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK]; see also Note, Developments in the Law - Privileged Communica-
tions, HARv. L. REV. 1480, 1493 (1985). Ethical standards are frequently intended
to protect the professions rather than to safeguard the rights of clients. See Smith,
Unfinished Business with Informed Consent Procedures, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Jan.
1981, at 22, col. 1.
1' C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE,
§ 5422 at 676 (1980).
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author has wondered to what extent the psychotherapist-patient privilege
may have been created by the fear that disclosures would threaten or
expose the therapist's practices and secrets-not the patient's.
4
Green and Nesson have classified privileges into two distinct types. 5
The first is based on the professional counseling relationship between the
holder of the privilege and the counselor for the purpose of fostering the
effectiveness of the professional services; this category would include the
lawyer-client, physician-patient, and priest-penitent privileges. 6 The sec-
ond category seeks to throw a veil of secrecy around certain areas of
privacy in order to protect autonomy and dignity; the marital privilege
and the privilege against self-incrimination fall into this latter group.
17
Green and Nesson emphasize the societal interests in the law of privileges
rather than embracing the power theory, political explanation of other
evidence scholars.
It should be pointed out that there is a legal difference between the
concepts of privilege and confidentiality. Privilege is an exception to the
general rule that the public has a right to every man's evidence; confi-
dentiality is an ethic that protects a client from unauthorized disclosure
of information. The presence of confidentiality alone is not enough to
support a privilege.1 8 Without a privilege statute, a professional may be
charged with contempt of court if he chooses not to testify. 19 On the other
hand, a breach of confidentiality may result in a tort action by the client/
patient.20 In other words, confidentiality is a professional duty to refrain
from speaking about certain matters, while privilege is a relief from the
duty to speak in court proceedings. 21 For instance, in State v. Mark,22 a
,4 Medlin, How Private is Privacy?, PSYCHIATRY DIGEST, Feb. 1969, at 13. The
psychotherapist-patient privilege actually belongs only to the patient. If the client
waives the privilege, the therapist must testify since he does not hold the privilege
independently of the client. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (1970).
' E. GREEN & C. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
(1983).
'16 Id. at 525-26.
,7 Id. See also Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege In Federal
Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 791 (1984).
' For example, professional accountants have a duty to maintain confiden-
tiality: however, unless there is a statute granting a privilege, an accountant
must testify in court about client confidences. On the other hand, the marital
communications privilege may exist by statute although there is no duty of con-
fidentiality in the marital relationship.
1" In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) (psy-
chotherapist held in contempt of court for refusing to testify about a patient where
the patient had waived the privilege).
20 See Comment, Psychotherapists' Liability for Extrajudicial Breaches of Con-
fidentiality, 18 ARIZ L. REV. 1061 (1976) (discussing causes of action against psy-
chotherapists for breaches of confidentiality).
2" Hayden, Should There Be A Psychotherapist Privilege In Military Courts-
Martial?, 123 MIL. L. REV. 31, 33 (1989).
22 23 Wash. App. 392, 394-95, 597 P.2d 406, 407-08 (1979).
[Vol. 5:2
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Washington court of appeals found that the confidentiality requirements
of the Washington Board of Pharmacy did not create an evidentiary priv-
ilege.23 Nonetheless, confidentiality and privilege continue to be used by
some writers in an interchangeable, and therefore confusing, manner.
24
No discussion of privileges would be complete without some discussion
of Wigmore's four conditions that must be met before any privilege can
be legally recognized. These almost universally accepted criteria are as
follows:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relationship between
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which, in the opinion of the com-
munity, ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
25
Unfortunately, Professor Wigmore does not discuss how he developed
these four postulates for determining the existence of a privilege.
A negative answer to any of the four criteria, in Wigmore's view, ne-
gated the justification for a privilege. Wigmore evaluated the husband-
wife, attorney-client, and clergy-communicant relationships to determine
whether each met the four criteria for a privilege. 26 Although the first
statutory recognition of the physician-patient privilege dates back to 1828
in New York, 27 Wigmore contended that the physician-patient relation-
1 In State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 104, 338 P.2d 319, 322 (1959), the
Washington Supreme Court stated: "It does not necessarily follow from the use
of the word confidential that it was the legislative intention that this word have
the same import as the word privileged."
2 See, e.g., Freudenheim, Guarding Medical Confidentiality, N.Y. Times, Jan.
1, 1991, at 24, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
25 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 527 (emphasis in original). Justice Dimond, in
a concurring opinion in Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,428-29 (Alaska 1976), argued
that the third criterion should not be used:
The need for a privilege should not depend upon community approval of
the relationship. Rather, it is ... the legitimate value to the participants
which should be weighed against the truth-finding function of the courts.
Some persons feel that religion is of no value to society. If this belief became
prevalent, then under the Wigmore canons, the priest-penitent privilege
would disappear....
Id. Those criteria have also been criticized for allowing too many privileges! See
Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its
Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1230
(1962).26 WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 642.
27 It was presumed that people would be more willing to seek medical treatment
if they were protected from disclosure of their condition. Since the time of its
adoption, the physician-patient privilege has been subject to the criticism that it
impedes a court's ability to determine the facts. See Guernsey, The Psychother-
apist-Patient Privilege In Child Placement: A Relevancy Analysis, 26 VILL. L. REV.
955, 959 (1981).
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ship succeeded only on the third test, and therefore, ought not to be
privileged. 28 Professor McCormick has concurred with Wigmore's conclu-
sions concerning the physician-patient privilege: "More than a century
of experience with the statutes has demonstrated that the privilege in
the main operates not as the shield of privacy but as the protector of
fraud. Consequently, the abandonment of the privilege seems the best
solution. '29 It is reasonable to assume that Wigmore did not evaluate the
psychotherapist-patient relationship because psychotherapy was in its
infancy at the time the privilege criteria were established.30 Several writ-
ers have noted, however, that Wigmore's four tests are satisfied in the
context of psychotherapist-patient relations even if there is no physician-
patient privilege according to the same criteria.3 The psychotherapeutic
relationship is by its nature more intimate and personal than the phy-
sician-patient relationship; patients will seek medical treatment even if
there is a risk of disclosure since there is little chance of stigmatization
in being treated by a general practitioner.3 2 The same cannot be said for
treatment by a psychotherapist.
33
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the funda-
mental principle that "the public .. . has a right to every man's evi-
dence." 34 As such, they are to be strictly construed and accepted "only to
the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding
relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predom-
inant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.
35
The most widely accepted privileges, and perhaps the least controversial,
are those which protect communications between attorney and client,
28 Many legal scholars agree. See, e.g., Curd, Privileged Communications Be-
tween the Doctor and his Patient - An Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 165
(1958); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 105 at 228.
31 Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, Privileged Communications For Psychother-
apists In Pennsylvania: A Time For Statutory Reform, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 267, 270
(1987).
31 See, e.g., Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege,
6 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1960), cited in FED. R. EVID. 504 advisory committee notes.
See also 4 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORTS AND SYMPOS-
IUMS, REPORT No. 45, 95 (1960); Note, Confidential Communications to a Psycho-
therapist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 384, 386-87 (1952).
Hayden, supra note 21, at 39.
Psychiatric communications deal with a patient's behavioral symptoms. Sen-
ator Eagleton, George McGovern's 1972 presidential running mate, was dropped
from the ticket when it was disclosed that he had received psychiatric care in the
past. A hospital record revealed hospital admissions where he received electrosh-
ock therapy for depression. No psychiatric history came to light; the very existence
of a record consigned Eagleton to the history books. See Slovenko, supra note 5,
at 652 n. 7.
' United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
3s Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
(Vol. 5:2
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husband and wife, and priest-penitent. The purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to encourage the client to make complete disclosure to his
attorney without fear that others may be informed.36 Complete disclosure
is necessary because attorneys are best able to handle matters in which
they are fully informed; a client will voluntarily disclose more information
if assured of confidentiality through the privilege.37 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege is the only testi-
monial privilege recognized at common law.3 8
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony allows one spouse to
prevent the other from adversely testifying against him. Justification for
this privilege has been found in its perceived role in fostering the harmony
and sanctity of the marriage relationship. 39 The privilege against adverse
spousal testimony is quite broad in that it applies to any adverse testi-
mony, not only confidential communications. 40 This broadness can result
in egregious abuse. For example, in State v. Jacques,41 the defendant
married the prosecution's star witness between his preliminary hearing
and trial. His wife's testimony at the preliminary hearing was held to be
inadmissible, and she was not required to testify due to the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony.42 Such abuse may have contributed
in part to the recent contraction of the scope of this privilege.43
-1 Greyhound Corp. v. Super. Ct., 56 Cal. 2d 355, 396, 364 P.2d 266, 288, 15
Cal. Rptr. 90, - (1961).
37 This essential trust in the attorney-client relationship has been cited as
precedent for a psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to promote full disclo-
sure and effective treatment. See Note, The Case For A Federal Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege That Protects Patient Identity, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1217 (1985).
38 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980). The Upjohn Court
held that the "purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank commu-
nication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice." Id. The
Upjohn case involved an internal investigation by a manufacturer's general coun-
sel that included sending questionnaires to the manufacturer's managers. Id. The
Court held that the responses to these questionnaires were within the attorney-
client privilege and that the work-product privilege protected the general coun-
sel's notes and memoranda based on oral statements. Id. But see Defense Lawyer
Is Jailed Over Client Confidentiality, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991 at A12, col. 3
(nat'l ed.) about a Pennsylvania lawyer who went to jail rather than answer a
subpoena requiring her to violate the lawyer-client privilege. The attorney, Linda
Backiel, is quoted from her cell stating, "I really think everyone who goes to law
school should spend a week in jail. I think they'd get a sense of the arbitrariness
and power of the law. I think they'd understand the importance of having an
advocate." Id.
31 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). A husband could prevent
his wife from testifying about criminal acts of the husband. Id. at 51.
41 Comment, The Marital Testimony and Communications Privileges: Improve-
ments and Uncertainties in California and Federal Courts, 9 U.C.D.L. REV. 569,
595 (1976).
C' 256 N.W.2d 559 (S.D. 1977).
2 Id. at 564.
, See e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 988 (1978) (holding that conversations between husband and wife about
crimes in which they have participated do not fall within the scope of privileged
marital communications).
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The priest-penitent privilege derives from society's desire to protect a
relationship of trust and confidence, as well as from a realization that
requiring clergy to testify will not necessarily produce testimony. The
concept of jailing a clergyman for adhering to the absolute duty imposed
upon him by deep religious beliefs is offensive. 44 In some jurisdictions, a
clergyman holds the privilege independently of the penitent, if revealing
the penitent's confidence would violate the tenets of the clergyman's
faith.4
It is worth mentioning that in recent years, courts have tended to take
seriously the Supreme Court's belief that, in general, the public has a
right to every man's evidence. 45 It should therefore not be surprising that
in the past few years several proposed new privileges have been rejected.
The rejections have included an employer-stenographer privilege, 4 7 a re-
quired reports privilege,"4 an accountant-client privilege 49 and a welfare
records privilege. 50 In fact, the psychotherapist-patient privilege may
have just been approved under the wire.51
III. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
By order of the Supreme Court, on November 20, 1972, a proposed set
of evidence rules was transmitted to Congress. They were the result of
seven years of labor by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence,
appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren.52 The Supreme Court's proposal
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV., 95, 113 (1983).
4 Id. at 137-38. This distinguishes the priest-penitent privilege from that of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege which is only held by the patient. However,
see Hayden, supra note 21, at 39 n. 59.
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
47United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977).
-In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1976).
49 Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Inv., 78 F.R.D. 295 (D. Md. 1978).
O State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169-70, 169 P.2d 706,
711 (1946).
51 Although no general physician-patient privilege was recognized at common
law, the states began to adopt limited statutory privileges for the psychotherapist-
patient relationship in the early 1950's. See Rule 504 Advisory Committee Note,
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1973). Some commentators have argued that a psychotherapist-patient privilege
will save a psychotherapist from being faced with a "cruel trilemma." (The term
was coined by Professor Robert Aronson, Professor of Evidence at the University
of Washington). Under the "cruel trilemma," psychotherapists are obligated to
choose among one of three undesirable results: 1) to violate the extraordinary
trust placed on them by their clients and the profession; 2) to lie, and thereby
commit perjury; or 3) to refuse to testify and thereby be held in contempt of court.
This dilemma has led to "memory lapses" on the witness stand, fabrications,
curtailment of therapy, and even the maintaining of two sets of records (or very
sparse record-keeping). See Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege In Wash-
ington: Extending The Privilege To Community Mental Health Clinics, 58 WASH.
L. REV. 565, 572 (1983).
52 Note, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Under Federal Rules Of Evidence
501, 75 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 37 (1984).
[Vol. 5:2
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consisted of thirteen rules including the following nine privileges: re-
quired reports,53 attorney-client communications,5 4 psychotherapist-pa-
tient communications, 55 husband-wife communications,50 clergy-
worshipper communications,57 political votes, 58 trade secrets,5 9 secrets of
state and other official information,0 and identities of informers.61 The
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, as defined in Proposed Rule 504, pro-
vided in pertinent part:
(b) General rule of privilege.
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent
any other person from disclosing confidential communications,
made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his mental
or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among him-
self, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in
the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psycho-
therapist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege.
The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by his guardian
or conservator, or by the personal representative of the de-
ceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may
claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His au-
thority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceed-
ings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psy-
chotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an ex-
amination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient,
communications made in the course thereof are not privileged
under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which
the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no priv-
ilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue
of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any pro-
ceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of
5 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 502, 56 F.R.D. 183, 234-35 (1972).
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503, 56 F.R.D. at 235-37.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 240-41.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 505, 56 F.R.D. at 244-45.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. at 247.
"PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 507, 56 F.R.D. at 249.
59 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 508, 56 F.R.D. at 249-50.
Go PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 509, 56 F.R.D. at 251-52.
61 PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 510, 56 F.R.D. at 255-58.
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his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any pro-
ceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an
element of his claim or his defense.
62
The proposed rules turned out to be quite controversial, prompting Con-
gress to intervene for the first time in the rule-making process. 63 Under
the Rules Enabling Act, the proposed rules would have taken effect au-
tomatically had Congress not acted within ninety days. 64 Congress took
the somewhat unusual step of amending the Rules Enabling Act so as to
require Congressional approval for any amendment of the rules on priv-
ilege only.6 Because the controversy over the privilege section threatened
to jeopardize passage of the entire package of evidence rules, the House
Judiciary Subcommittee unanimously agreed that the specific privilege
rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated6 6 and proposed in its
substitution the present Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or polit-
62 56 F.R.D. at 240-41. The privilege, as originally written, left out exceptions
that would later be formulated by the courts such as the exception for reporting
child abusers and the duty to warn potential victims about the dangerousness of
a patient. See, e.g., Note, Confidentiality, An Absolute Obligation?, 52 MOn. L.*
REV. 715 (1989); Note, Duties In Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report Child
Abuse Inflicted By Clients And Confided In Therapy?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645
(1985).
Another real difficulty with the proposed privilege is that, as written, it only
applies to psychiatrists and psychologists; left out are other providers of psy-
chotherapy such as psychiatric social workers. See Slovenko, supra note 5, at 663-
64 n. 28.
63 For one thing, they raised the issue of federalism. Proposed Rule 501 would
have required that in the federal courts rules of privilege would only be governed
by the Constitution, Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules as adopted by the
Supreme Court; privileges created by state law would have been ignored. Congress
resolved this issue by adopting the present Rule 501 which provides that state
privilege law controls in diversity cases but privilege issues in other cases will
be governed by federal or state law depending on the particular element of the
claim or defense and whether state law supplies the rule.
The proposed rules also created controversy about the allocation of power in
society; the proposed rules gave the impression that the rights of government
and corporations took a higher place than individual rights. This is why the
proposed rules included privileges for trade secrets, secrets of state and other
official information. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 12, at 687.
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976). This rule gives the Court the power to prescribe
rules of civil procedure. The evidence rules were proposed under § 2072 which
governs rules of civil procedure.
28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). Approval was not required for the amendment of
any other rules.
Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H. R. 5463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Senate Judiciary Committee Staff Memorandum),
reprinted in 4 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 355, 356 (1980).
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ical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
state, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with state law.67
This rule was the only one on which all parties could agree since it, in
effect, would leave the federal law of privilege as it had already been-
an area that federal courts were to continue to develop on a case-by-case
basis.68
In civil actions that involve "an element of a claim or defense as to
which state law supplies the rule of decision,"'69 state privilege law applies
because no overriding federal interest exists to outweigh enforcement of
state policy. Rule 501 mandates application of federal, rather than state
privilege law in criminal and non-diversity civil cases brought in federal
court because federal law is enforced in those cases. 70 The result of the
Rule 501 compromise was to leave the recognition of a psychotherapist-
patient privilege in a state of chaos; some federal courts have rejected
the privilege,71 while others have embraced it.72 After the adoption of
Rule 501, the National Commission of Uniform Laws included a slightly
modified version of Rule 504 in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. This rule
has been adopted verbatim or almost verbatim in thirteen states: Cali-
7FED. R. EVID. 501.
120 CONG. REC. 40, 891 (1974).
FED. R. EVID. 501.
70 Thus, the Menendez case may have been brought in state, rather than fed-
eral, court since the psychotherapist-patient privilege exists on the state level in
California. Had the case been brought in federal court, as a criminal case it would
have called for federal privilege law. The federal circuits are split in recognizing
the psychotherapist-patient privilege; even some that recognize it will not do so
in a criminal case. See infra notes 71-72, 133-36 and accompanying text. Congress
based Rule 501 on the rationale that federal law should not supercede state law,
in a substantive area such as privileges, without a compelling reason. United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983) (psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege does not exist); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp.
696 (S.D.N.Y.), affld 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to recognize the priv-
ilege); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the
privilege); United States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 946, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (priv-
ilege did not exist at common law and therefore not at federal law); United States
v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Md. 1979) (no privilege exists). These courts do
not distinguish the psychotherapist-patient privilege from the physician-patient
privilege.
12 See. e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983) (court used Proposed Rule 504 to recognize psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege); Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576, 579 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (using Proposed
Rule 504 to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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fornia,73 Delaware, 74 Florida, 7 Hawaii,76 Illinois,77 Maine,78 Nebraska,7 9
Nevada, 0 New Mexico,"' North Dakota, 2 Oklahoma,8 3 Oregon,8 4 and Wis-
consin.8 5
What is it about the psychotherapist-patient privilege that has resulted
in its uncertain adoption and application within the legal system?
IV. TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR CHILDHOOD: THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Psychotherapy is the treatment of mental or emotional disorders by
verbal or other symbolic communication between patient and therapist. 6
The therapy is often augmented by drugs but is frequently used as the
sole method of treatment for interpersonal problems or for dealing with
thoughts, feelings, or actions that people find disagreeable to themselves
or others.8 7 Treatment is largely in the hands of the traditional mental
health professions of psychiatry, psychology, and social work; however,
therapy is increasingly performed by mental health counselors, pastoral
counselors and other professionals.8 8 Although there are many types of
psychotherapy, the model upon which privilege arguments are usually
based is psychoanalysis as originated by Sigmund Freud. Psychoanalysis
is used as a springboard to support the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because it is based on the theory that a patient's problems result from
conflicts repressed in the unconscious which must be probed in order to
treat the patient.
8 9
71 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1990).
14 DEL R. EVID. 503 (1990).
75 FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (1985).
71 HAw. REV. STAT. § 626-504.1 (Spec. Pamphlet 1980).
71 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5306 (1985).
7B ME. R. Evir. 503(b) (1986).
79 NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1985).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.215 (Supp. 1981).
81 N.M. R. EvID. 504 (1983).
2 N.D. R. EVID. 503 (Supp. 1985).
' OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West Supp. 1989).
84 OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (Supp. 1983).
85 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West Supp. 1986).
-J. KOVAL, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THERAPY 264 (1976).
81 See Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, supra note 30, at 268.
Id. Indeed one of the great difficulties with the privilege is defining the
professional to whom it should apply.
89 The basic argument is that unless the patient is assured that the therapist
has no authority over him - e.g., through disclosure in a courtroom - the built-in
resistance to full disclosure won't be overcome.
We pledge him to obey the fundamental rule of analysis, which is hence
forward to govern his behavior toward us. He is to tell us not only what he
can say authentically and willingly, what will give him relief like a confes-
sion, but everything else as well that his self-observation yields him, eve-
rything that comes into his head, even if it is disagreeable for him to say
it, even if it seems unimportant or actually nonsensical.
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The protection of a relationship of trust and confidence between patient
and therapist and the encouragement of free disclosure are the underlying
policies of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.90 Congress was aware of
this special need for confidentiality even though it rejected Rule 504:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to
maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is
completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk
freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to func-
tion without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality
and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be
exceptions to this general rule .... there is wide agreement
that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric
treatment. The relationship may well be likened to that of the
priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only ex-
plore the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their
unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effec-
tiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and,
in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely.
A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.91
By refusing to adopt Rule 504 as proposed by the Supreme Court, Congress
did not intend to repudiate the psychotherapist-patient privilege but to
merely consign its application to a case-by-case basis.
92
23 S. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, in STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 141 (1964) (emphasis in
original). Psychotherapy has also been defined as:
A method or system of alleviating or curing certain forms of disease, par-
ticularly diseases of the nervous system or such as are traceable to nervous
disorders by suggestion, persuasion, encouragement, the inspiration of hope
or confidence, the discouragement of morbid memories, associations, or be-
liefs, and other similar means addressed to the mental state of the patient
without (or sometimes in conjunction with) the administration of drugs or
other physical remedies.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (5th ed. 1979).
90 See Note, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining The
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 797-800 (1985).
91 Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504, 56 F.R.D. at 242 (1972) (Advis. Comm. Note)
(quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY REPORT No. 45, 92
(1960)). An often quoted statement on this subject was made by Judge Luther
Alverson in an address before the Connecticut Mental Health Association:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world.
He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express; he
lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.
Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what will be
expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition....
It would be too much to expect them to do if they knew that all they say -
and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say - may be revealed
to the whole world from a witness stand.
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEINOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952).
92 The Senate Report to the new rules stated:
The Committee has received a considerable volume of correspondence from
psychiatric organizations and psychiatrists concerning the deletion of rule
504 of the rules submitted by the Supreme Court. It should be clearly
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One commentator, advocating that a psychotherapist-patient privilege
may be included within the constitutional right to privacy,93 argued that
the state's interest in having evidence for trial might not be helped in
the long run by requiring that the confidences of therapy be revealed in
court.9 4 The promotion of evidence for trial may be more apparent than
real; as patients recognize that their confidences may be revealed, they
might be expected to minimize the confidential information revealed in
therapy.9 5 In the final analysis, this would actually limit rather than
increase the amount of evidence in court that would derive from psy-
chotherapy.9 6 Dean Smith and other advocates of the constitutional right
to privacy as the basis for the psychotherapist-patient privilege argue
that theirs is a more secure foundation than reading the privilege into
Rule 501-neither legislatures nor the courts can remove a constitutionally
protected right.
9 7
There is evidence that some people choose to pay for psychotherapy out
of their own pockets rather than risk disclosure of treatment by filing
insurance claims - a clear example that patients do in fact think about
and react to the possibilities of disclosure.98 Dr. Steven Sharfstein esti-
mated that, in 1981, about fifteen percent of all adults who had employer-
provided mental health insurance waived reimbursement in order to con-
understood that, in approving this general rule as to privileges, the action
of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a
psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the enumerated priv-
ileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. Rather, our action should be
understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based
on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on
a case-by-case basis.
S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD NEWS 7051, 7059 (1974).93 Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1980).
94 Id. at 38.
95 Id.
96Id. The author also applies this logic to the duty to warn potential victims
of a psychiatrically ill patient, namely that such warnings will increase, not
decrease, injuries and deaths by discouraging dangerous people from obtaining
psychotherapy. Id. at 56 n. 290. On the issue of psychiatrists reporting patients
who reveal that they have been abusing children, Dean Smith has written, "By
requiring therapists to breach the confidence of patients, the state would be
discouraging child abusers from seeking effective psychotherapy to deal with the
problems that cause them to abuse their children." Id. at 59.
7 See Note, supra note 52, at 399. A constitutional basis might also be of greater
help to the poor, most of whom receive psychiatric care from social workers who
are usually not included within the statutory versions of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege. See, e.g., Psychiatrist/Patient Privilege Doesn't Apply to Super-
vised Counselor, Court Rules, The Psychiatric Times, Feb. 1991, at 61, col. 1
(Indiana Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision that a social worker,
supervised by a psychiatrist, is not covered by physician/patient privilege. It is
unclear why the psychotherapist-patient privilege was not discussed.).
Note, supra note 37, at 1228.
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ceal that they received treatment 9 One person even quit his job because
he had to hand his medical bills to the personnel manager of his com-
pany.100 Public reaction to the fact that Senator Thomas F. Eagleton had
been treated for depression led to George McGovern choosing another
vice presidential candidate. 0 1 "Evidence is plentiful that a former mental
patient will encounter serious obstacles in attempting to find a job ...
In the job market, it is better to be an ex-felon than an ex-patient."'1
2 It
seems reasonable to conclude that at least some people care about privacy
in psychotherapy enough to warrant the judicial system being circum-
spect in its admission of evidence that would abridge the privilege.
In spite of all the talk about confidential information never being re-
leased (except in cases of imminent danger), such information is regularly
disclosed. Although not in a judicial setting, the "privilege" of confiden-
tiality is discarded routinely in reports, in insurance claims, to other
professionals, in educational settings, and in research presentations. 10
There is reason to believe that many therapists accept a concept of privacy
and confidentiality that is very paternalistic, allowing the therapist to
be the judge of when the patient's expectation of confidentiality is justified
and when it can be ignored.10 4 Even Freud published case histories. 1 5
Confidentiality is necessarily violated in forms of psychotherapy that
require the inclusion of others as part of the treatment, such as family
therapy, couples therapy, and group therapy. Family therapists have
found that opening up certain family secrets for discussion contributes
Id. at n. 55. See also Defensiveness May Function to Prevent Psychopathology,
The Psychiatric Times, Feb. 1991, at 14, col. 1; Patient-Therapist Relationship
Contributes to Therapeutic Outcome, The Psychiatric Times, Feb. 1991, at 25, col.1.
'o0 He took a different job without this requirement! Note, supra note 37, at
1228 n. 55.
101 Id. at n. 56. Politicians fear admitting that they have received psychotherapy
because of the effect it might have on voter confidence.
102 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E. D. Wis. 1972) quoting Bruce
J. Ennis, ACLU, New York City, 1970 Hearings, at 284, vacated, 414 U.S. 473
(1974). It is not clear how much, if at all, this situation has changed. However,
even those in psychiatry recognize that secrecy has its limits in terms of prac-
ticality. For instance, if a patient tells a doctor in confidence that he has brought
a time bomb into the hospital and hidden it under the bed of one of his patients,
"it would be a strange doctor indeed who would feel that this professional con-
fidence should not be violated." K. MENNINGER, A MANUAL FOR PSYCHIATRIC CASE
STUDY 36 (1960).
losWinslade & Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Autonomy in Psychotherapy,
64 NEB. L. REV. 578, 615 (1985). The educational settings include verbal or written
presentation of case histories, trainee observations of therapy sessions, and su-
pervisor observation of trainee work.
'"In practice, the avowal of limited disclosure to other professionals is widely
abused, with violations ranging from cocktail party anecdotes (neither consented
to nor adequately disguised), to case conferences in which no attempt is made to
alter any details of the patient/client's life, and even the name is often revealed.
Id. at 616.
"5 Some read like detective thrillers and carry sensational nicknames like,
"The Rat Man" or "The Wolf Man." Slovenko, Psychotherapy And Confidentiality,
24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375, 383 n. 24 (1975).
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to the well-being of the entire family.10 6 Not all people in psychotherapy
seek to avoid public disclosure - some disclose information as a "cry for
help" and hope that others will intercede. 10 7 Some in analysis see their
treatment as a status symbol rather than something to hide. 08
The issue of whether there is a constitutional right to privacy as a basis
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege remains largely unresolved. 1' 9
The Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Rule 501 stated
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was one of nine rules defining
"specific nonconstitutional privileges which the federal courts must rec-
ognize... ."110 The arguments for and against the psychotherapist-patient
privilege may not be the sort which justify unyielding constitutional
rulings. Indeed, as the court in In re Lifschutzll discussed, therapists
have never been able to practice with a guarantee of total confidentiality;
it is therefore not entirely clear why they think that it is impossible to
proceed with anything less than such a guarantee." 2
The state's interest in overriding the privilege is to obtain important
evidence. The psychotherapist-patient privilege presents a greater po-
tential loss of information than, for example, the attorney-client privilege
where a party may still obtain the privileged information via discovery.1S3
"; I. CLICK & D. KESSLER, MARITAL AND FAMILY THERAPY 308 (2d ed. 1980).
107 Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025, 1039-40 (1974).
10, M. GROSS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY 147 (1978).
109 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n. 24 (1977). There is also authority to
the effect that the Court's decisions on the right to privacy refer only to family
relations. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Whalen, the Court
stopped short of recognizing a constitutional right in informational privacy, es-
pecially if the state takes appropriate steps to protect the information. Although
the Court in the last twenty-five years has time and again invoked the consti-
tutional right of privacy, none of the decisions have established this right with
respect to a psychotherapist's disclosure of information gained from the thera-
peutic relationship. See also J. P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087-90 (6th Cir.
1981) ('The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy. Nor has
the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a general right to privacy .... [W]e
conclude that the Constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclo-
sure of private information.").
110 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) (emphasis added).
" 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
"1
2 Id. at 438, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at _. "The practice of psychoth-
erapy has grown, indeed flourished, in an environment of non-absolute privilege."
Lifschutz rejected the contention that the therapist has a privacy interest in the
therapy conducted; only the patient has the right to prohibit or authorize disclo-
sure of confidences revealed during psychotherapy. See Guernsey, supra note 27,
at 982 n. 152 for a list of cases which have rejected a constitutional basis for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. It should be pointed out that where a psychi-
atrist is subpoenaed, the attorney does not necessarily await the testimony with
bated breath. "The records, if any, are illegible or cryptic; and many psychiatrists
say that since records are rarely kept, they could destroy theirs without arousing
suspicion. In lieu of records, if called as a witness, the psychiatrist is not apt to
be friendly." Slovenko, supra note 5, at 653.
113 Assuming that there are no ancillary issues, such as Fifth Amendment
issues.
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Information that a therapist obtained in a psychiatric session can prob-
ably not be replicated; the prosecution's right to conduct its own psychi-
atric examination may not be an adequate substitute for the earlier, non-
custodial (non-pressured) exam. Loss of information that is essential and
relevant"4 may be too high a price to pay to avoid an invasion into the
psychotherapist-patient relationship where it follows perhaps an equally
great intrusion into a defendant's personal life - public accusation and a
public trial.l ' The Supreme Court has described the importance of rel-
evant evidence to our adversarial system in the following language:
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system
is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on
a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very in-
tegrity of thejudicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework
of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is
imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory process
be available for the production of evidence either by the pros-
ecution or by the defense.,
From the above discussion, it should be evident that the arguments for
and against the psychotherapist-patient privilege are attractive. Will
disclosure of patient confidences cause patients to discontinue therapy,
not seek it or make it ineffective? In other words, will a weak privilege
promote mental illness? On the other hand, are the confidential com-
munications of psychotherapy truly important and necessary to an ac-
curate resolution of a judicial proceeding? Would it not be wonderful if a
scientific study could be done to attempt to answer these questions in
order to guide the development of privilege law! No empirical research
was cited by the supporters of proposed Rule 504.117 In fact, no empirical
study supporting or opposing a physician-patient or psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege was cited by any of the drafters of state statutes in support
of the privileges. However, there have been three studies reported in legal
journals.
In 1962, the Yale Law Journal published a student comment entitled,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals.118 Sev-
"4"For example, admitting to murdering one's parents to speed up one's in-
heritance is certainly essential and relevant in the murder trial following the
crime.
"I Saltzburg, Privileges And Professionals: Lawyers And Psychiatrists, 66 VA.
L. REV. 597, 624 (1980).
"I United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). See also State v. Gotfrey,
598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979), where the court complained that a psychologist priv-
ilege closes "another window to the light of the truth." Id. at 1327-28.
117 The consequences of an erroneous choice may be substantial - the curtail-
ment of effective therapy or inaccurate decisions in judicial proceedings concern-
ing life, liberty or property.
si8 Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226
(1962).
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enty-one percent of the lay people questioned reported that they thought
they would be less open in therapy if they knew their psychotherapist
was legally obligated to release information from the therapy. 19 However,
since the questionnaire informed those polled of the possibility ofjudicial
disclosure, it assumed away the major issue of whether therapy patients
contemplate the issues of disclosure and privilege prior to laying bare
their minds in therapy. If people don't know about it, how can the privilege
provide an inducement to greater openness in therapy?
120
In 1976, the Supreme Court of California decided Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California,'2' the landmark case which held that ther-
apists owe a duty to use reasonable care to protect persons threatened
by their patients. As with the possible erosion of their evidentiary priv-
ilege, therapists predicted that a duty to warn per Tarasoff would result
in the destruction of trust between therapist and patient, dooming effec-
tive therapy. The Stanford Law Review conducted a survey of California
therapists to determine the effects of Tarasoff.22 The study found that
one-fourth of the responding therapists observed that their patients were
reluctant to discuss violent tendencies when the patient learned that the
therapist might, in some circumstances, breach confidentiality. 123 How-
ever, the Tarasoff decision, with its conditional abrogation of confiden-
tiality, has not resulted in the destruction of effective therapeutic
relationships as prophesied by its critics.
2 4
Shuman and Weiner 125 conducted a study of the effects of a privilege
statute passed in Texas in 1979. They found no increase in treatment due
to the passing of the privilege; 26 ninety-six percent of patients relied
more heavily on the therapist's ethics for confidentiality than on a priv-
ilege statute. 27 The study concluded that, for most people, the absence
of a privilege would not delay or deter therapy because they were unaware
of its existence. In fact, the most prominent cause for withholding infor-
mation by patients was not the status of the privilege, but fear of the
therapist's personal judgment. 12 8 A majority of the judges polled thought
119 Id. at 1255.
120 Nearly one third of the lawyers polled stated that the privilege excluded
information unavailable from nonprivileged sources. Id. at 1261.
121 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
122 Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Deter-
mine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REv. 165 (1978).
123 Id. at 177, 183.
124 Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists - A Judicial Threat to the
Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 293-95 (1977). Opponents of the
duty to warn concede that psychiatry has flourished in jurisdictions that do not
recognize a psychiatrist's testimonial privilege but suggest that it would have
flourished even more had some patients not been deterred. Id. at 295.
125 Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilage, 60 N.C.L. REv. 893 (1982).
16Id. at 919.
127 Id. at 920.
128 Id. Thus, the action of the legislature in passing the privilege had little or
no effect on the success or failure of therapy. Responses from psychiatrists also
indicated that the passage of a privilege statute in 1979 had little impact on their
practice of psychiatry. Id. at 922.
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that the confidential communications submitted as evidence before them
from therapeutic sessions were important to those cases and necessary
for an accurate resolution of contested issues.' 29 The judges also thought
that the desired information was not available from a nonconfidential
source and that such admissions were not sought to harass or encourage
settlement. 30 No positive evidence was found that any emotional damage
is done to patients who are called to account for their behavior in a court
of law. 13' Unfortunately, despite great hope and anticipated euphoria, the
empirical studies have not been very helpful in resolving the debate
surrounding the privilege issue. In fact, the results of the studies are
either used or ignored by both sides of the issue.'
3 2
The confusion resulting from the different policy considerations on both
sides of the psychotherapist-patient privilege issue has predictably re-
sulted in legal chaos: several federal courts have established that Rule
501 includes a psychotherapist-patient privilege,' 3  while others have
rejected it, holding that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is in-
distinguishable from the physician-patient relationship. 3 4 At least one
29 Id. at 923.
,3 0 Id. The study concluded that although withholding data from therapists is
common, it has little relationship to fear of disclosure but rather to the judgment
of the therapist. Seventy percent of this information had to do with sexual acts
and thoughts, nine percent concerned thoughts of violence and an additional nine
percent concerned financial issues. Id. at 926. But when the therapist threatens
to disclose or actually does so, communication of violent urges drops and often
premature termination results. Id. See also Wagner & Weinstein, Therapeutic
Alliance and Involuntary Commitment of a Minor, 8 JEFFERSON J. PSYCHIATRY 3
(1990) (illustrating the negative effect on the therapeutic alliance when a minor
is present during commitment hearings at which his psychiatrist testified).
131 Shuman & Weiner, supra note 125, at 926.
,32 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 93, at 27 n. 168.
133 See, e.g., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983) (privilege evaluated according to common law precedents in case holding
two psychiatrists in civil contempt for failing to respond to a subpoena by a grand
jury in connection with billing fraud; the court wanted the identities of certain
patients, dates of treatment and length of treatment on each date. Although the
Zuniga court recognized the existence of the privilege, it held that it did not apply
to the mere disclosure of a patient's identity); In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th
Cir. 1983) (same basic facts as Zuniga but the court found that the patient had
waived the privilege by filing insurance reimbursement claims). See also Hawaii
Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979) where the court
stated that there was "no history of judicial, legislative or public acceptance of
government access to confidential communications between a psychiatrist and
his patient. To the contrary, courts, legislatures and commentators have long
agreed on the need to protect those communications from disclosure." Id. at 1048-
49.
,u See, e.g., United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a lower court had committed reversible error by denying mail fraud defend-
ant's access to psychiatric material concerning the government's witness because,
at the common law, there was no physician-patient privilege. "There is no federal
statute creating such a privilege. Therefore, testimony concerning the doctor-
patient relationship is admissible in Federal Court." Id. at 1167 n. 9); United
States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982)
(refusing to recognize psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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commentator has pointed out that the very real possibility that a patient's
communications to his psychotherapist will be protected in state court
suits but not in federal court suits raising federal questions is problematic
as it may dilute the effectiveness of state privilege law.135 Additionally,
the absence of a clear federal rule on the psychotherapist-patient privilege
may have contributed to the unsure manner in which state psychother-
apist privilege statutes have been implemented. 3 6 If one thing is clear,
it is that the status and applicability of this privilege is anything but
clear.
V. Do You HAVE ANY OTHER PROBLEMS?: OTHER DIFFICULTIES
WITH THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A continuing thorny issue in this area of privilege law is: which prac-
titioners of therapy are covered by the privilege? Slovenko13 7 wondered
whether the privilege should extend to the hairdresser of a woman who
may in effect provide the services of a therapist!138 There are great var-
iations among the states as to which professionals are covered by the
privilege: some consider communications to psychologists, psychiatrists,
and social workers within the protection of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege; 139 some states include psychologist and psychiatrists only in
their definition of psychotherapists;140 others have separate privilege stat-
utes for physicians, 141 psychiatrists, 142 licensed psychologists,1 43 and social
workers.'" Sometimes, the privilege applies only to psychiatrists and
131 Smith, supra note 93, at 3 n. 11.
136 See, e.g., Myers v. State, 251 Ga. 883, 884-85, 310 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1984)
(nurse allowed to testify concerning her patient's confession of murder - privilege
did not apply because the nurse was employed by the hospital and not the doctor);
People v. Doe, 103 Ill. App. 3d 208, 430 N.E.2d 696 (1982) (therapist's knowledge
of identity of individual resembling suspected ax murderer was not privileged);
State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 895-96 (S.D. 1979) (defendant could not invoke
privilege after he told social worker of murder). Thus, it appears that the Me-
nendez brothers would be out of luck in one of these states.
137 See supra note 5, at 665.
lId at n. 29.
When women go to a hairdresser, something happens to them. They feel
safe, they relax. The hairdresser knows what their skin is like under the
makeup; he knows their age; they don't have to keep up any kind of pretense.
Women tell a hairdresser things they wouldn't dare confess to a priest, and
they are open about matters they'd try to conceal from a doctor.
J. STEINBECK, TRAVELS WITH CHARLEY: IN SEARCH OF AMERICA (1962).
13, Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, supra note 30, at 275 n. 37.
140 Id.
141 Id. at n. 38.
142 Id. at 276 n. 39.
1
43 Id. at n. 40. The functional distinction betwen psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists is becoming increasingly blurred. See Garb, Can Psychologists Learn To
Prescribe?, Am. Med. News, Feb. 25, 1991, at 7, col. 1.
- Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, supra note 30, at 275 n. 41. See also Physician-
Patient Privilege in Indiana Limited to M.D.'s, Those They Closely Supervise,
Psychiatric News, Feb. 1, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
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psychologists in criminal cases; social workers, school psychologists, and
family, marriage and child counselors have no privilege in criminal
cases. 14- On the other hand, a different jurisdiction may only permit the
psychologist-patient privilege in civil cases.
146
One commentator has suggested that by limiting the privilege among
those performing therapy to psychologists and/or psychiatrists, states
have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' 7 Indeed, the poor, who receive most of their psychotherapeutic
services from social workers, have often not been protected by the tes-
timonial psychotherapist-patient privilege.
14
It is important to note that a court-ordered psychiatric examination of
a defendant does not harm the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege - it is solely diagnostic and should not deter the patient from
receiving psychotherapy elsewhere. This examination is generally for a
determination of mental state/competency-to-stand-trial issues. It is not
permissible, because of the Fifth Amendment, to use the court-ordered
psychiatric exam as a source of evidence which would be relevant on the
issue of guilt. An admission to the crime during such an exam cannot be
considered by the trier of fact in determining whether the defendant
committed the acts constituting the crime charged - but the admission
can be used insofar as it relates to the defendant's mental state. 149 Indeed,
part of the attraction for the prosecution to obtain Dr. Oziel's testimony
as to the confessions of the Menendez brothers stems in part from the
fact that this evidence would be free of Fifth Amendment problems; Dr.
Oziel was not an agent of the state when he obtained the confessions. 150
VI. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS?:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST PRIVILEGE
Special exemptions and exceptions have been carved out of the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege for those areas where the need for the in-
145 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1987). The Menendez brothers are
fortunate that they confessed to a psychologist and not a social worker! See supra
note 1.
146 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-399, 8.01-400.2 (1984).
147 Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: Are Some Patients More
Privileged Than Others?, 10 PAc. L.J. 801, 808-14 (1979).
141 Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psychother-
apist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1050 (1973).
149 See, e.g., Griffith & Griffith, The Patient's Right To Protection Against Self-
Incrimination During the Psychiatric Examination, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 269 (1982).
See also Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452, 318
N.Y.S.2d 705 (1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971); State v. Evans, 104 Ariz.
434, 436, 454 P.2d 976, 978 (1969). However, some consider statements made to
a psychiatrist "real evidence" comparable with handwriting or fingerprints, as
opposed to testimonial evidence; if so, objection to their admissibility is lessened.
151 See supra note 1.
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formation or testimony has been found to outweigh the benefits of
confidentiality. Probably the most well known state-demanded breach of
patient confidentiality is the duty that a therapist must warn potential
victims of the violence threatened by their patients.5 1 Although it may
seem ironic, the special relationship between a therapist and patient
which on the one hand is cause for protection of confidence also creates
the duty to warn. 5 2 In terms of tort law, the special relationship between
psychotherapist and patient creates a duty, in terms of a legal obligation,
joining a series of other duty-creating relationships, including hospital-
patient, parent-babysitter, school-pupil, tavern owner-business invitee,
jailer-prisoner, and host-guest. 53 The therapist's duty to warn has been
expanded to include cases where the threatened damage is only to prop-
erty,154 unintentional torts, and foreseeable although unidentifiable vic-
tims. 55 It is not clear as yet in the Menendez facts whether Dr. Oziel had
any foreknowledge of the brothers' threats to hurt their parents; that is,
whether the psychologist violated his duty to warn.
5 6
"I Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
152 In absence of such a special relationship, there is no duty to be a Good
Samaritan and save a potential victim. As hard as it is to accept, in secular law,
the swimmer who sees another drowning before his eyes is not required to do
anything about it and may watch the person drown. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 114
Ga. App. 541, 151 S.E.2d 905 (1966). The law does not require anyone to bind up
the wounds of a stranger bleeding to death (Riley v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., 160
S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)), to prevent a neighbor's child from hammering a
dangerous explosive (Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955)), or to prevent
a train from blocking a fire engine on its way to a fire (Louisville & Nashville
R. Co. v. Scruggs & Echols, 161 Ala. 97, 49 So. 399 (1909)).
' W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 342 (4th ed. 1971).
Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d
422 (1985) (case dealt with threat by patient to burn his father's barn down -
which he did). However, in California, which is credited with starting the duty
to warn trend in Tarasoff, a psychotherapist is under no duty to disclose a con-
fidential communication where the risk of harm is only property damage. See
Note, Extending A Psychotherapist's Duty To Warn Beyond Protecting Life: Who
Should Lock The Barn Door?, 11 VT. L. REV. 353, 359 (1986).
"I Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (first case to hold
a therapist liable for his patient's unintentional, drug-induced, tort). See Note,
Psychiatrists Are Subject To Tort Liability For Failing To Protect The Public From
Their Patients' Unintentional Acts, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 315 (1985). However, Cali-
fornia's Supreme Court restricted the Tarasoff holding to cases where there is a
threat to an identifiable or identified victim in Thompson v. County of Alameda,
27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). See also, Lipari v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) where the court found a psy-
chiatrist liable for failing to confine a patient where he could have reasonably
foreseen the patient's endangering others even though there was no readily iden-
tifiable victim in advance.
"I Third parties may have a cause of action against a therapist for failure to
warn when they are identifiable potential victims of the therapist's patient, even
when the patient made no specific threat against them. The therapist is bound
by this duty because he holds himself out and is licensed as one who diagnoses
psychological problems and emotional and mental disorders. However, in Bellah
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As a practical matter, a psychotherapist would fulfill his duty to warn
simply by giving a timely warning to the potential victim.'57 If, after
receiving a warning, the potential victim calls the police or initiates a
commitment proceeding, the psychotherapist may be required to corro-
borate the warning. If a reasonable person would not believe that the
intended victim could protect himself adequately after a timely warn-
ing,15 the psychotherapist should be required to initiate emergency de-
tention or civil commitment proceedings (if he believed the patient met
the jurisdiction's standard of dangerousness for commitment).' 59
v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 916, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92, 95 (1977), the warning
required by Tarasoff was limited to potential danger directed at others, not self-
directed; the therapist has no duty to warn anyone of his patient's suicidal tend-
encies. See Note, The Scope of a Psychiatrist's Duty to Third Persons: The Pro-
tective Privilege Ends Where the Public Peril Begins, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770
(1984). One state court held that a psychotherapist may be liable for breaching
the confidentiality of his patient if he voluntarily provides information without
first asserting a privilege and then awaiting a court order - except where there
is an affirmative duty to warn. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 228
Cal. Rptr. 545 (1986).
It is interesting to note that the psychiatric profession strongly objected to the
creation of a duty to warn, using arguments similar to those used against excep-
tions to the evidentiary privilege, i.e., that it would deter people from seeking
therapy. In addition, the American Psychiatric Association argued that psychi-
atrists cannot accurately predict dangerousness; courts have generally rejected
this argument (although technically correct), finding that all that is really re-
quired of a psychotherapist with regard to the duty to warn is to exercise due
care as defined by reference to the standards of the psychotherapeutic community;
that is, what a competent therapist in similar circumstances would do. The A.P.A.
once argued for a court rule of evidence barring psychiatric testimony on the
issue of future criminal conduct. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983),
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this proposal. See Peter and Sanchez, supra
note 43, at 471. See also Comment, Perreira v. State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1192
(1990) discussing case of Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989) where the
Colorado Supreme Court held that a state psychiatrist was liable for any third
party harm resulting from the negligent release of a violent, involuntarily com-
mitted patient; Freedman, The Psychiatrist's Dilemma: Protect the Public or Safe-
guard Individual Liberty?, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 255 (1988); Note, supra
note 156, at 770, for a discussion of the lawsuit, brought by White House Press
Secretary James Brady and two other men injured in John Hinckley's assassi-
nation attempt on President Reagan, against Hinckley's psychiatrist for failing
to warn law enforcement officials (and Hinckley's parents) of the patient's con-
dition and potential for political assassination.
"57 In Tarasoff, the victim's life would have been spared had she not voluntarily
associated with her killer.
"' Such as by not associating with the patient, by locking doors, or by securing
increased protection.
- See Note, Professional Obligation and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a
Psychiatrist Protect His Patient's Intended Victim?, 91 YALE L.J. 1430, 1445
(1982). Although mental health professionals have both ethical and professional
guidelines, none really address, surprisingly, Tarasoff-like situations. See AMER-
ICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1981);
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
(1981); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS (1980);
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF PSYCHO-
LOGICAL SERVICES (1977).
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Another exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege exists when
the patient has raised his mental condition as an issue in the case. 160 The
basic premise of this patient-litigant exception is that the patient has
waived any privilege covering information relevant to his mental or emo-
tional condition.16 ' If a party places his physical or mental condition into
issue, such as in a suit for personal injuries, he cannot then preclude an
opposing party's inquiry into that condition by asserting a privilege. This
exception has been applied as a justification for broad discovery of mental
and physical examinations under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the
legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which
the action is pending may order the party to submit to a phys-
ical or mental examination by a physician or to the produce
for examination the person in his custody or legal control. The
order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and
upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and
shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be
made. 6'
The waiver basis of the patient-litigant exception to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege appears again in other instances where a patient
has been found to waive the privilege. In In re Zuniga,'6' described as
the most significant federal case on the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, 64 two psychotherapists were held in civil contempt for failing to
- See, e.g., Miller v. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 741 (M.D.
Pa. 1979) (even assuming a constitutional basis for the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, there is an exception when the patient raises her mental condition as
an issue).
"I In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). Psy-
chotherapists oppose this exception as they see it interfering with effective ther-
apy, although it may help the patient's legal posture that he appear as crazy as
possible. A client who is eager to win a case may lose his incentive to improve
his mental condition. "What may be in a person's best legal interests, i.e., main-
tenance of dramatic symptoms in order to present a sound case for disability or
liability, may be directly contrary to his therapeutic interests, i.e., relinquishing
of symptoms." Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical
Necessities for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093
(1974).
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 35 (a). In other words, Dr. Oziel's testimony about the Me-
nendez brothers would be available if their mental condition is raised by them
as an issue in the case. It is important to note that normally, evidence given by
a psychotherapist relating to a victim's allegations would be hearsay, but the
evidence given relating to a defendant's admissions survive hearsay problems by
fitting within the exception for admissions by a party to the action. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1220 (1984). See Note, Vanishing Exception to the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege: The Child Abuse Reporting Act, 16 PAC. L. J. 335, 349 n. 148 (1984).
10 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
164 Hayden, supra note 21, at 52.
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respond to a subpoena duces tecum issued by two separate grand juries.16
The records were sought in relation to investigations of alleged fraud in
Blue Cross-Blue Shield billings. The Sixth Circuit upheld the contempt
judgments because the provider had waived the psychotherapist-patient
privilege by disclosure of similar information to insurance companies.166
Perhaps the most widely recognized exception to the psychotherapist-
patient privilege is the duty of the psychotherapist to report the occur-
rence of child abuse revealed during therapy. All fifty states have child
abuse reporting statutes to protect the child,'167 and many state evidence
codes explicitly recognize such testimony to be an exception to the priv-
ilege.'6 8 Experts in the field of abuse believe that a single therapist cannot
handle the complexities and multiple needs of an abusive family and that
it is to the advantage of both the patient and therapist to seek the par-
ticipation of protective agencies.' 69 Indeed, many authorities believe that
the criminal justice system plays an important and positive role in the
treatment of sex offenders.170 Arguably, a patient who is abusing children
is currently a danger to others and so the duty to report is similar to the
duty to warn discussed previously; the duty is to prevent a future crime,
not punish a past one.
However, applying the dangerous patient duty to warn exception to
child abuse may be complicated. What if the patient is in fact no longer
dangerous? From the language of some child abuse reporting statutes, it
appears that past abuse is included in the exception to the privilege.1
71
The decision whether or not to investigate is left to child protective serv-
ices, based on such factors as how long ago the abuse happened, the type
11 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 634 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
'6 Id. at 640. For a recent discussion of issues involved in the financial reim-
bursement of psychiatric care, see Zigun, Technical Considerations Regarding
Requests for Disability Documentation in the Context of Psychotherapy, 21 Psy-
CHIATRIC ANNALS 112 (Feb. 1991).
16
7 Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, The Child-Abuse Exception,
And The Protection Of Privacy Through The Fifth Amendment, 6 WHrrrIER L.
REV. 1033, 1039 (1984). The laws were passed in response to the public concern
generated by a well publicized study which documented physical injuries to chil-
dren and coined the term "battered child syndrome." Kempe, Silverman, Droeg-
mueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. A.M.A. 17 (1962).
16 Note, supra note 167, at 1042 n. 67. Although most commentators agree
that one would be hard pressed to find a state interest that is more compelling
than the protection of the welfare of children, some still argue that a privilege
exception would actually discourage child abusers from seeking psychotherapy
to control their abuse. See Smith, supra note 43, at 56 n. 290.
'6 Note, supra note 62, at 664.
170 Id. at 667. This may counteract some of the hesitancy which a therapist
may experience in reporting child abuse. A child plaintiff wishing to bring a civil
action for negligence against a non-reporting psychotherapist must prove the
usual four elements of a negligence cause of action: a duty recognized by law;
breach of the duty; a reasonably close causal connection between the breaching
conduct and the resulting injury; and actual loss or damage. W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
171 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 1982).
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of abuse involved, and whether the abuser still has contact with the
child. 172 Thus, at least at first glance, it appears that the child abuse
exception is in fact an exception for a past crime. 173 However, research
indicates that child abuse is frequently linked to a certain style of child
rearing and is generally repetitive in nature - so that the focus of the
reporting may really be to prevent any future episodes even if the patient
is "cured."' 17 4 It is also possible that child abuse may not serve as an
example for other past crimes, such as homicide,' 75 because of the defer-
ence our judicial system has traditionally given to what it considers to
be in the best interests of children. As Judge Cardozo, in his uniquely
elegant style, wrote:
The Chancellor... does not proceed upon the theory that the
petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action
against the other or indeed against anyone. He acts as parens
patriae to do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to
put himself in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful
parent,' and make provision for the child accordingly .... He is
not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to
compose their private differences. He is not determining rights
'as between a parent and a child,' or as between one parent
and another. .. . Equity does not concern itself with such dis-
putes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern is for the
child.
176
172 Note, supra note 62, at 668. The leading case on this issue appears to be
another California case(!), People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194
Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983), which reconciled the statutory duty of the psychotherapist
to testify against his patient with the patient's expectation of privacy by stating
that the patient must be made aware of the psychotherapist's legal duty to testify
concerning the contents of his counseling services. It may be this type of therapist
disclosure that Dean Smith felt would turn abusers away from therapy. Smith,
supra note 93, at 56 n. 290.
173 A past crime exception would allow the state to subpoena Dr. Oziel to testify
against the Menendez brothers. As with cases of child abuse where the unavail-
ability of the abused child to testify against the abuser makes the therapist's
testimony possibly the only admissible evidence of guilt, so too, Dr. Oziel's tes-
timony (or the tapes of his conversations with the brothers) may be the only
evidence the dead parents have about their children's greed.
174 Note, supra note 62, at 652. However, if it is indeed possible to have a
"cured" child abuser who is allowed to remain with the child, the argument does
remain that the child abuse exception may be an example of a privilege exception
for a past crime.
"' Dean Smith has argued that after the commission of a crime, presumably
including homicide, the state's interest in obtaining what amounts to a confession
to the therapist is weak because, at that point, the state can no longer prevent
the crime's commission. Smith, supra note 93, at 55. Theoretically, though, the
argument could be made that some criminal behavior is prone to repetition just
like child abuse, and should be an exception to the privilege if the crime is
outrageous enough to society's sensibilities - such as homicide.
17'Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
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Some states specifically provide that the past crime of homicide is an
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 77 Within federal agen-
cies, there is precedent in both the Freedom of Information Act' 78 and the
Privacy Act of 1974' 79 to allow release of personnel and medical files
for necessary law enforcement activities such as a criminal prosecution. 80
Just as the attorney-client privilege does not apply where a client seeks
legal help in the commission of a crime or fraud, 8 ' some psychotherapist-
patient privilege statutes preclude a patient from claiming the privilege
for activities that further a crime or fraud.8 2 Although there does not
appear to be a reported case using this argument, it might be possible to
argue that an admission to a therapist of a crime, especially a personally
troubling one such as a homicide, actually furthers the crime by making
it easier for the patient to live with himself (i.e., not turn himself in).
The therapist may provide the criminal/patient with an outlet for the
emotional need to confess which previously might have driven the patient
to confess to society and to the criminal justice system. No patient has a
right to exploit a confidential relationship in order to, in effect, entrap
the therapist as an unwitting participant in the criminal activity.lu
Finally, at least on the federal level, there is an offense called "mis-
prison of felony" which provides that a person is guilty of misprison when
he has "knowledge of the actual commission of a felony ... and . .. con-
ceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same" to the
177 See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1987) (providing that social
workers, school psychologists and marriage, family and child counselors have no
privilege in criminal cases, but psychiatrists and psychologists do, which covers
Dr. Oziel); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307(b)(1) (1981) (exception to privilege for evi-
dence in criminal cases where an accused is charged with causing death of, or
inflicting injuries on, a human being, and disclosure is required in the interests
of justice); ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 91.5, para. 810(a)(9) (no privilege where disclosure
relates directly to the circumstances surrounding a homicide); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 25-33-1-17 (1) (Burns Supp. 1986) (exception to privilege in homicide trials if
the disclosure relates directly to facts or circumstances of homicide); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-399, 8.01-400.2 (1984) (physician-patient and psychologist-patient
privileges apply only in civil cases). Recommendations have been made to modify
Proposed Rule 504 to incorporate a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
"in trials for homicide where the disclosure relates directly to the fact or im-
mediate circumstances of said homicide." Knapp, VandeCreek & Zirkel, supra
note 30, at 291.
178 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981).
'79 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1976).
180 5 U.S.C. § 552 a(b)(7), 552 a(b)(11). However, this probably would not be of
much value to the prosecution in the Menendez case in a state court; it does
illustrate that, at least in the area of government personnel files, privacy interests
have given way to those of the accurate administration of justice.
18 Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Consti-
tutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 473-74 (1977).
182 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1018 (West 1990). This applies in the Menendez case.
183 For instance, it is considered a conspiracy to defraud the government if a
doctor condones a patient who comes to a Veterans Administration Hospital with
certain psychiatric symptoms and, in the course of a session, confesses that he
has been receiving compensation for self-inflicted wounds which he had claimed
were received in combat. See Slovenko, supra note 105, at 394 n. 62.
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authorities.8 1 Convictions are rare because courts have held that the
Government must prove an affirmative act of concealment to make its
case. 185 However, this may be possible to prove where a patient has in-
formed his therapist of a heinous crime; in such circumstances, the ther-
apist may have to actively conceal reporting his patient to the authorities
(or testifying against his patient). Otherwise, the therapist would have
to submit to the duty he has to his own human dignity to violate his
patient's confidence.
86
VII. I SEE OUR SESSION IS ALMOST OVER:
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The state of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is confusing to say
the least. Some federal circuits recognize it while others do not; state
statutes generally recognize it for at least some categories of professionals
but are riddled with legislative exceptions. Empirical studies have pro-
duced mixed results in attempting to verify the philosophical foundation
for the privilege in terms of the negative effect disclosure might have on
psychotherapy. However, it is clear that, in certain circumstances, the
privilege excludes vital relevant evidence, perhaps the only evidence
available. The child abuse reporting exception, which has been univer-
sally adopted by all fifty states, clearly indicates the willingness of leg-
islatures to sacrifice confidentiality for the administration ofjustice where
the crime is outrageous to society.
It is not unreasonable to assert that homicide, where the only evidence
available relating to the actual crime might be a psychotherapist's tes-
timony, is an example of a compelling area warranting the sacrifice of
confidentiality. This is especially true since the cost to psychotherapy in
general is dubious, while the loss of relevant evidence is extremely high.
Especially in a well-publicized homicide, already involving great intru-
sion into the private, personal life of a defendant, the loss of the psycho-
therapist's evidence is an unrealistically high price to pay for an already
lost sense of confidentiality.
This important but unnecessarily murky area would be greatly helped
by the adoption of an explicit federal rule of evidence clearly outlining
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which professionals it applies to,
and exceptions for specific past crimes, such as homicide and past/future
crimes like child abuse. Clear federal action would provide a guideline
to states grappling with the disparate interests of the criminal justice
system and the psychotherapeutic community. Perhaps then it will not
matter to a therapy patient in what state his crime is committed, or in
which forum (state v. federal) his lawyer defends.
BRIAN DOMB
'8 Id. at 389 n. 43.
Misprison of felony might not be an available cause of action in the Menendez
case unless there is a parallel cause of action recognized in the state system.
186 Tanay, Psychiatric News, April 16, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
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